The best of all possible coexistence by Fortelius, Mikael et al.
ORIGINAL PAPER
The best of all possible coexistence
Mikael Fortelius1,2 & Peter Myrdal3 & Indre Zliobaite4,2
Received: 7 March 2020 /Revised: 11 July 2020 /Accepted: 30 September 2020
# The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
The writings of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) provide a window on early evolutionary thinking of a kind interestingly
different from the roots of modern evolutionary theory as it emerged in the years following the French Revolution. Here we relate
aspects of Leibniz’s thinking to methods of modern palaeoecology and show that, despite a different terminology and a different
hierarchic focus, Leibniz emerges as a strikingly modern theoretician, who viewed the living world as dynamic and capable of
adaptive change. The coexistence approach of palaeoecological reconstruction, developed by Volker Mosbrugger and collabo-
rators, with its core assumption of harmoniously co-adapted communities with strong historical legacy, represents, in a positive
sense, a more Leibnizian view than functionally based and theoretically history-free approaches, such as ecometrics. Recalling
Leibniz’s thinking helps to highlight how palaeoecological reconstruction is about much more than reliably establishing the
ecological and climatic situation of a given fossil locality. While reliable reconstructions of past conditions are certainly of great
value in research, it is arguably the need to think deeply about how the living world really works that keeps palaeoecological
reconstruction such a long-running and central aspect of evolutionary science. And while we struggle to understand the coex-
istence and dynamic interaction of endless levels of living agents of the living world, simultaneously large and small, global and
local, the coexistence approach of palaeoecological reconstruction remains both an outstandingly operational method and part of
a philosophical tradition reaching back to the very earliest evolutionary thinking.
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Introduction
The core effort of palaeontology, ever since its emergence in
the birth throes of the French Revolution, has arguably been
the reconstruction of extinct organisms and their living envi-
ronments, famously and masterfully introduced by George
Cuvier (Rudwick 1976). Perhaps reflecting the chaotic condi-
tions of its birth date, Cuvierian palaeontology saw the world
as essentially static, with different states of existence separated
by abrupt revolutions. In this it critically differs from the gra-
dational transformism of contemporaries such as Lamarck and
from the evolutionary palaeontology that was to evolve in of
later decades. Reconstruction of bygone organisms and envi-
ronments nonetheless remains an activity at the centre of the
discipline today, and much of the basic business involved
remains similar in principle. Perhaps this is inevitable: even
when the main objective is to document and understand
change one needs a solid grasp of what was there, before,
during, and after.
As Cuvier critically realised, satisfactory reconstruction re-
quires understanding the rules that determine how organisms
relate to the demands posed by their environments. This basic
requirement enabled Cuvier’s spectacular successes and still
underlies current methodologies of reconstruction, both of the
organisms themselves and, by something akin to reverse en-
gineering, of environments as deduced from the functional
traits or environmental tolerance of their inhabitants. The latter
approaches are of two kinds: reconstruction methodologies
based on physical characteristics of inhabitants (Wolfe 1995;
Fortelius et al. 2002; Spicer et al. 2009; Liu et al. 2012; Barr
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2017) and methodologies based on connecting coexisting fos-
sil taxa with their nearest living relatives (Mosbrugger and
Utescher 1997; Mosbrugger 2009). All such methods rely to
a greater or lesser extent on the principle of actualism postulating
that the processes that formed the biota of the past were similar in
kind to the processes that can be observed in nature today
(Rudwick 1976). From this, it is but a short step to the assump-
tion that the relationships between biota and environments are at
some sort of dynamic equilibrium, maintained by processes of
adaptive evolution. And the step from such a view to some
pragmatic concept of dynamic optimisation is also short.
It is common to make jocular reference to the German
enlightenment philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s con-
cept of the best of all possible worlds (or, as it might be,
islands, or wheels, or friends, or even teeth (Evans and
Sanson 2003)), but for most non-specialists, the reality of
Leibniz’s true thoughts and intentions remain buried under
the alluvium of scorn poured on him byVoltaire in his satirical
novel Candide (Voltaire 1759). And even if his true target
may have been his contemporary antagonist and competitor
Pierre-Louis Moreau de Maupertuis rather than Leibniz, who
by then had been dead for 40 years (Ekeland 2000), Voltaire’s
parodical depiction of Leibniz as Dr. Pangloss has prevailed.
In chapter one, Dr. Pangloss explains to the naive Candide:
It is demonstrable that things cannot be otherwise than
as they are; for as all things have been created for some
end, they must necessarily be created for the best end.
Observe, for instance, the nose is formed for spectacles,
therefore we wear spectacles. (Voltaire 1759).
We intuitively understand that Dr. Pangloss’ explanation
has the causality reversed—in real life, spectacles are formed
for the nose; therefore, we wear spectacles. The learned doc-
tor’s reasoning was only associative but not causal.
Associative approaches to palaeoecological reconstruction,
such as nearest-living-relative-based coexistence, will work
if the world is static or changing only very slowly. Fun-
ctional or causal approaches should work even when the
world is changing and becomes particularly useful when it is
changing more rapidly. Even in the evolutionary framework
of modern palaeobiology, a tension remains between the as-
sociative and the functional interpretations of actualism
(Galbrun et al. 2018).
Today the choice between taxonomic and trait-based ap-
proaches to palaeoecological reconstruction is often seen as a
pragmatic matter of convenience, but in principle, there is
more at stake here than how accurately a particular approach
works—or does not work. Fundamentally, it is about the na-
ture of the living world and even about the coherence of the
eco-evolutionary world view. Howmuch inertia is there in the
system? How heritable is the ecological niche? How much
historical legacy must be accounted for in attempts to model
and forecast ecological change (Conradi et al. 2020)? As
Cuvier might have asked, if the world is functionally perfect,
why would it change at all? Leibniz, perhaps unexpectedly,
offers an integrative perspective and explanation. Indeed, up-
on removal of the Panglossian cloak, Leibniz is revealed as a
sophisticated thinker who foreshadowed a wide spectrum of
scientific developments, not least in the field of evolutionary
biology. Here we review Leibniz’s theoretical connections to
some current strands of palaeoecological thought and meth-
odology, especially as they pertain to palaeoecological
reconstruction.
Harmony and integrity of function
Animal function, as it might be of teeth, has typically been
thought of as something that would be optimised at the level
of the individual. The British philosopher Charleton, a con-
temporary of Leibniz and known to him, is recorded by
Samuel Pepys as claiming, on the 28th of July 1666 (shortly
before the great fire of London), the ability to tell the natural
diet of any animal from its teeth and suggesting that “man’s, it
is plain, was not for flesh but for fruit” (Latham 1985, 645).
Yet it is surprisingly difficult to make a clear dichotomy be-
tween an individual and a working ensemble here. Although it
might at first sight seem that the individual part or trait is
optimised, it is actually always some level of a system.
Cuvier himself developed the theoretical framework known
as “the correlation of parts”, encapsulating the idea that every
part of an organism is perfectly designed for its function and
missing parts can in principle be deduced, or even computed,
from known ones, as in Newtonian mechanics (Rudwick
1976). And, as it turns out, this was already foreshadowed
by Leibniz, whose “animal economy” associates with the re-
lation between organs and function coordinated in a living
system (Smith 2011, 62). For him, the system is not closed,
and the animal body results from infinitely many soul-like
substances, where the idea of soul-likeness picks up on the
traditional Aristotelian notion of soul as a principle of life
(Leibniz 1875–90, VI 540/Leibniz 1989a, 587) or what
Leibniz, again drawing on Aristotelian terminology, calls “en-
telechy” (Leibniz 1875–90, IV 478/Leibniz 1989b, 139).
Indeed, in hisMonadology (1714), Leibniz famously explains
that a substance or monad is “the entelechy or soul” of an
“organised” or “organic” body together with which it “consti-
tutes what may be called a living being” (Leibniz 1875–90,
617–8/Leibniz 1989b, 221).1 While a living body has what
Leibniz calls “a dominant entelechy”—its principle of life—
its body is further constituted by an infinity of other living
1 For present purposes, we set aside the vexed issue of the ontological status of
bodies in Leibniz. For diverging interpretations, see, e.g. Rutherford 1995;
Phemister 2005; Smith 2011.
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beings: “the limbs of this living body are full of other living
beings, plants, animals, each of which also has its entelechy,
or its dominant soul” (Leibniz 1875–90, VI 619/Leibniz
1989b, 222).
This relative and infinite systems perspective closely links
to key concepts in evolutionary biology. Darwin’s famous
metaphor of the wedges (dropped for unknown reasons from
the Origin after the second edition) is very much in the same
spirit: “The face of Nature may be compared to a yielding
surface, with ten thousand sharp wedges packed close together
and driven inwards by incessant blows, sometimes one wedge
being struck, and then another with greater force” (Darwin
1859, 67). For Leibniz, too, the world is primarily optimised
at the system level—indeed, this seems to be the import of his
notorious claim that this is the best of all possible worlds. In
fact, it could be argued that the entire universe, for Leibniz, is
fundamentally to be understood as one large biosphere, given
the way in which living things are metaphysically basic.2
Leibniz’s understanding of species of course differs impor-
tantly from the Darwinian one. It is well known that the sci-
entific revolution was associated with a critical attitude to an
Aristotelian view of species essences as fundamental
organising principles in the universe. In the early development
of evolutionary thinking, some, like Lamarck or perhaps
Erasmus Darwin, saw species as only human abstractions on
a continuous chain of transformation, while others, like
Geoffroy, instead emphasised transformation by sudden leaps
(saltations). For such early evolutionists, there was no place
for extinction as we know it. Either the world flows onwithout
distinctive breaks, and the coming and going of species are to
some extent a matter of how we divide up the flow, or
saltational change simply adds to the existing diversity.
Interestingly, the person who brought extinction into
palaeontological focus was Cuvier, who explicitly denied the
possibility of transformation of species.
Leibniz, who precedes these thinkers in time, holds a more
complex position. Justin Smith, a leading scholar on Leibniz,
has recently argued that rather than rejecting their reality,
Leibniz reconceives species in terms of origin so that an indi-
vidual’s species membership is determined by shared ancestry
(Smith 2011, 246). This idea is closely linked to the fact that
while Leibniz denies the extinction of species, he sees species
as capable of evolving: “For species can be greatly changed by
the span of time, as by the interval of space, as is well
witnessed by the differences between our animals and those
of America” (quoted by Smith 2011, 256). At the same time,
Leibniz also countenances the possibility of individuals evolv-
ing from one species to another, an idea at least in part moti-
vated by his conception of substance as indestructible (see,
e.g. Leibniz 1875–90, VI 619/Leibniz 1989b, 222).
However more exactly these different ideas are supposed to
hang together, what is important for our purposes is the way in
which Leibniz’s somewhat peculiar views on evolution at the
level of species as well as individuals indicate the dynamism
at the centre of his thought. The relevance of his philosophy to
contemporary evolutionary theory lies, in our view, not so
much in the details of his conception of species as in his view
of the optimisation of the global order as dynamic.
Not only is Leibniz’s world dynamic but also integrated
and complete at any point in time; it is capable of becoming
better through change or alternative integration of its
parts as “the different parts variously exchange perfec-
tion between themselves” (Leibniz 1948, 95/Leibniz
2006, 196). This combination of integrated dynamics
and completeness allows many variants of coexistence
to be viable. Leibniz’s world, accordingly, is always in
harmony. In some ways, this resembles balance in game
design, where rules are tuned such that any strategy can
win, no strategy is superior, and yet there are no com-
ponents that are ineffective. An unbalanced system
would represent wasted developmental resources and
would imply existence of a static optimum. Instead,
Leibniz world is in harmony as it is and yet leaves
open possibilities for evolution.
This balanced, non-wasteful world connects to the (some-
what mysterious) principle of least action known from seven-
teenth century physics (Feynman 1942; Ekeland 2000), a prin-
ciple that has its background in Leibniz’s work on optics
(McDonough 2018). The solution requires finding the
path that has the least value, the least investment of
energy perhaps. How is it possible to find the most
energy-efficient path and yet preserve harmony?
Wouldn’t no change be the most efficient use of energy,
especially if the world is already perfect at any given
time? And how do we even tell, except in the longest
retrospect, whether a change is for the better or for the
worse? “Afflictions that are bad in the short run”,
Leibniz explains in his On the Ultimate Origination of
Things, “are good in their effect, since they constitute a
short path to greater perfection”, adding that “this is
what you might call stepping back in order to leap
forward with greater force (one retreats the better to
leap forward)” (Leibniz 1875–90, VII 307–8/Leibniz
1989b, 154). Would the principle of least action allow
afflictions?
Such questions are very much a matter of perspective. For
Cuvier, thinking of perfectly fine-tuned animals, the only con-
ceivable change was degeneration, change for the worse.
Conversely, such fine-tuning would necessarily suffer if the
organism stays the same but the environment changes. From
this perspective, Leibniz appears to have been ahead of his
time in postulating that the world is created by God such that,
2 This does not imply that we need to consider the universe as a single entity
(which Leibniz denied). Cf. our remark below about the ontological status of
biotic communities.
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in virtue of the natures of its components, it accommodates the
greatest variety of beings (Rutherford 1995, 30).3 As such,
Leibniz’s conception of the world seems to be in line with
key aspects of contemporary theories of self-organising sys-
tems, according to which the resulting organisation is wholly
decentralised, distributed over the components of the system,
while the rules specifying interactions among the system’s
components are executed using only local information
(Camazine et al. 2003).
There is a hierarchy of system levels here, and things may
appear different depending on the level observed. Individuals,
species, populations, communities, ecosystems, and the bio-
sphere —all represents potential targets for optimisation—
given appropriate processes and under whatever constraints
may apply. For Leibniz, apparently adverse effects (“afflic-
tions”) at lower levels were there in order to improve optimi-
sation at higher levels, as he explains using the analogy with a
painting:
Look at a very beautiful picture, and cover it up except
for some small part. What will it look like but some
confused combination of colors, without delight, with-
out art; indeed the more closely we examine it the more
it will look that way. But as soon as the covering is
removed, and you see the whole surface from an appro-
priate place, you will understand that what looked like
accidental splotches on the canvas were made with con-
summate skill by the creator of the work. (Leibniz 1875-
90, VII 306/Leibniz 1989b, 153).
This benign view of adversity, famously ridiculed by
Voltaire, somewhat foreshadows Charles Darwin’s view that,
despite all the suffering necessary for natural selection to
work, there is still more happiness than suffering in the world
(Darwin 1958). This idea remains characteristic of evolution-
ary thinking today: populations adapt through differential re-
productive success of their members and the evolution of pop-
ulations, in turn, has cascading effects at the levels of species,
communities, and above.
The fact that Darwin focused at the species level
while Leibniz was primarily concerned with the “world”
hides considerable convergence in their thinking, includ-
ing also the shared view that constraints on change are
intrinsic to the system, rather than extrinsically imposed
limits. Such a system-based perspective on function is
inevitably dynamic: rather than optimise everything,
you optimise some parts at the cost of others. In contrast
to Voltaire’s parody, the best of all possible worlds was
not a tautology, nor was it static. Leibniz and Darwin
shared a dynamic view of the world as an interconnected
system, which contrasts sharply with the static version of
Cuvierian correlation of parts, where the only possible
result of change is disharmony and deterioration of func-
tion. Despite important differences between Leibniz’s
conception of species and the Darwinian one, he appears,
at a more general level, to accommodate what today we
would call adaptive evolution, capable of tracking a
changing world and, in doing so, causing further change
in turn.
The queen and the anarchist
Leibniz thought, as did Lamarck, that climatic and environ-
mental influence can alter traits within members of a species
(Smith 2011, 264). Superficially this seems to contradict
Darwin’s emphasis on competition as the main propeller of
evolution, but upon closer scrutiny, the views converge to a
surprising degree.
Darwin’s ten thousand wedges metaphor for the com-
petition between species was cited above: when one
wedge is driven inwards, the others have to pop out.
Van Valen (1973) rephrased this principle as the Red
Queen’s hypothesis: “a change in the realised absolute
fitness of one species is balanced by an equal and oppo-
site net change in the realized absolute fitness of all
interacting species considered together.” One strand in
Leibniz’s thought clearly seems to resonate with this
modern idea: “If the perfection of the world remains
the same, some substances cannot continually increase
in perfection without others continually decreasing in
perfection” (Leibniz 2006, 196). For Leibniz, the best
possible world was a dynamic one that allowed individ-
uals to develop via continuous exchange. To use a word
common in modern evolutionary literature, it is a world
of tradeoffs, even a world to be understood as a zero
sum game, as it was implicitly for Darwin and explicitly
for Van Valen (1980).
Yet in Leibniz we also find another strand, according
to which the perfection of the world, rather than being
constant, is increasing: “we must also recognise a certain
constant and unbounded progress in the whole universe,
so that it always proceeds to better greater development
(cultus)” (Leibniz 1875–90, VII 308/Leibniz 1989b, 154;
see Rutherford 1995, 52). Indeed, this would be part of
what makes this world the best possible (Leibniz 1948,
95/Leibniz 2006, 198). The emphasis on progress is, for
Leibniz, closely connected to the idea that an individ-
ual’s perfection lies in her contribution to the “common
good” (Leibniz 1875–90, VII 307/Leibniz 1989b, 154).
In this respect, Leibniz’s conception of the evolution of
the world seems to depart from what has widely been
3 We do not here wish to take a stand on the interpretive question of whether
the idea of optimisation is in tension with his claim that the actual world
maximises perfection (see, e.g. Rutherford 1995 and Roinila 2007).
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seen as the main mechanism of natural selection. Instead,
he would seem to be on the side of the famous Russian
anarchist count Petr Kropotkin, who emphasised cooper-
ation and held that mutual aid (symbiosis by a modern
name) is prevalent in the living world (Kropotkin 1902).
“Horses and deer unite to protect each from their foe,
wolves and lions gather to hunt, while bees and ants
work together in many different ways. Kropotkin said
that mutual support is an established fact within the
feathered world, with eagles, pelicans, vultures, spar-
rows, and other fowl, collectively searching for and shar-
ing food. Some species of birds even gather together at
the end of the day to sleep” (Mason 2019).
Far from eccentric, the view that symbiosis and positive
coevolution are important factors in biological evolution
(Margulis and Fester 1991) has been gaining considerable
currency in recent decades. The concepts of niche construc-
tion (Matthews et al. 2014) and holobiont (Gilbert and Tauber
2016) are recent additions to the list of evolutionary concepts
that reverberate with a Leibnizian sense of a world both inte-
grated and complete, yet capable of improvement through
change or alternative integration of its parts. Instead of view-
ing ecosystems as sets of fiercely competing individuals and
species, ecosystems are here seen more as integrated teams,
where the participants at all levels, including the intra-individ-
ual, collaborate for shared system-level benefit and compete
with other such teams. The trendy concept of the gut biome
will be a familiar example of an ecosystem within an individ-
ual. The living world appears as endless levels of components,
living agents, simultaneously large and small, global and lo-
cal. The mechanism of perfection is recursive, as with fractals,
where you zoom in on a small part only to find that it looks
like the whole world.
Whether this new emphasis on collaboration will serve to
tilt the balance in the age-old (and perhaps ultimately unre-
solvable) question of whether biotic communities are integrat-
ed entities in their own right, more than the sum of their con-
stituent species, or just assemblages of independently occur-
ring species, remains to be seen.
The ghost of coexistence past
This finally brings us to the coexistence approach (Mosbrugger
and Utescher 1997; Mosbrugger 2009). Coexistence belongs to
the class of approaches that reason about the past via their
nearest living relatives. The approach goes back to Oswald
von Heer (as referred in Mosbrugger 2009), who was
Darwin’s correspondent and critic. In a treatise on the fossil
flora of Switzerland, Heer reasoned about the past climate of
Switzerland via the current distribution of the nearest living
relatives of the fossil plant species. Similar approaches were
later used widely in palaeoecology and especially
palaeoclimatology, both aquatic and terrestrial, and were, until
the discovery of stable isotope geochemistry, probably themain
source of information about conditions in the more recent geo-
logical past.
The principle behind the method is to assume that the cli-
matic or ecological characteristics of a fossil taxon are similar
to those of its nearest living relative. Typically, assemblages
of present-day taxa are constructed to match real fossil com-
munities, whose environments are reconstructed from over-
laps of known climatic tolerances of the modern species.
The key requirement for this to work is that the world changes
at most reasonably slowly. At the core of the coexistence
approach, we find the assumption of harmoniously co-
adapted communities with strong historical legacy. In this
respect, the approach can then be said to represent, in a posi-
tive sense, a more Leibnizian view than functionally based
and theoretically history-free approaches, such as ecometrics.
As we have seen, Leibniz’s world is—to put it in contempo-
rary terms—self-organising in a way that maximises harmony
and minimises energy expenditure. Its perfection is dynamic,
integrated over time, and hence the best possible.
In the case of the coexistence approach, the constructed
assemblages are of course only shadows or projections of
the real communities that once existed. Here we find an in-
triguing connection to Leibniz, who seems to suggest that the
world itself is an assemblage of perspectives or projections.
He writes in section 57 of the Monadology:
Et comme une même ville regardée de differens cotés
paroist toute autre et est commemultipliée perspectivement,
il arrive de même, que par la multitude infinie des sub-
stances simples, il y a comme autant de differens univers,
qui ne sont pourtant que les perspectives d’un seul selon les
differens points de veue de chaqueMonade. (Leibniz 1875-
90, VI 616)4
Might we posit the best of all possible coexistence as one
such perspective on the best of all possible worlds as we un-
derstand it here, the dynamic interaction of endless levels of
living agents, simultaneously large and small, global and lo-
cal? Might that even be the fundamental entity that we strug-
gle to capture with the concept of community evolution?
These are deep questions, unanswerable perhaps, but mean-
while the coexistence approach remains a delightfully
Leibnizian window on communities and conditions of the past
and a mainstay of palaeoecology as we know it today.
4 “Just as the same city viewed from different directions appears entirely
different and, as it were, multiplied perspectively, in just the same way it
happens that, because of the infinite multitude of simple substances, there
are, as it were, just as many universes, which are, nevertheless, only perspec-
tives on a single one, corresponding to the different points of view of each
monad” (Leibniz 1989b, 220).
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